A common technique to by-pass 2-D face recognition systems is to use photographs of spoofed identities. Un fortunately, research in counter-measures to this type of attack have not kept-up -even if such threats have been known for nearly a decade, there seems to exist no consensus on best practices, techniques or protocols for developing and testing spoofing-detectors for face recog nition. We attribute the reason for this delay, partly, to the unavailability of public databases and protocols to study solutions and compare results. To this purpose we introduce the publicly available PRINT-ATTACK database and exemplify how to use its companion pro tocol with a motion-based algorithm that detects corre lations between the person's head movements and the scene context. The results are to be used as basis for comparison to other counter-measure techniques. The PRINT-ATTACK database contains 200 videos of real accesses and 200 videos of spoof attempts using printed photographs of 50 different identities.
Introduction
Identity theft is a concern that prevents the main stream adoption of biometrics as de facto form of identification in commercial systems [1] . Contrary to password-protected systems, our biometric information is widely available and extremely easy to sample. It suffices a small search on the internet to unveil pre labelled samples from users at specialized websites such as Flickr or Facebook. Images can also be easily cap tured at distance without previous consent. Users can not trust that these samples will not be dishonestly used to assume their identity before biometric recogni tion systems.
In this work we are particularly concerned with di-978-1-4577-1359-0/11/$26.00 ©2011 IEEE rect [2] print-attacks to unimodal 2-D (visual spectra) face-recognition systemsl. These so-called spoofing at tempts [3] are direct attacks to the input sensors of the biometric system. Attackers in this case are assumed not to have access to the internals of the recognition system and manage to penetrate by only displaying printed photos of the attacked identity to the input camera. This type of attack is therefore very easy to reproduce and has great potential to succeed [4] .
Despite the fact that solutions exist for spoof pre vention using multi-modal techniques [5, 6, 7, 8] , it is our belief that research for counter-measures solely based on unimodal 2-D imagery has not yet reached a matured state. There seems to exist no consensus on best practices and techniques to be deployed on attack detection using non-intrusive methods. The number of publications on the subject is small. A missing key to this puzzle is the lack of standard databases to test counter-measures, followed by a set of protocols to eval uate performance and allow for objective comparison.
This work introduces a publicly available database, protocols and a baseline technique to evaluate counter measures to spoofing attacks in face recognition sys tems. The remaining of this text is organized as fol lows: Section 2 discusses the current state-of-the-art in anti-spoofing for 2-D face recognition systems. Sec tion 3 describes the PRINT-ATTACK anti-spoofing database and defines protocols for its usage. Section 4 defines a baseline technique that can be used for com parison with other algorithms. Section 5 reports on the experimental setup and results. Finally, Section 6 con cludes and discusses possible extensions of this work.
Literature Survey
Face recognition systems are known to respond weakly to attacks for a long time [9, 4] and are eas ily spoofed using a simple photograph of the enrolled person's face, which may be displayed in hard-copy or on a screen. In this short survey, we focus on methods that present counter-measures to such kind of attacks.
Anti-spoofing for 2-D face recognition systems can be coarsely classified in 3 categories with respect to the clues used for attack detection: motion, texture anal ysis and liveness detection. In motion analysis one is interested in detecting clues generated when two dimensional counterfeits are presented to the system input camera, for example photos or video clips. Pla nar objects will move significantly differently from real human faces which are 3-D objects, in many cases and such deformation patterns can be used for spoof de tection. For example, [10] explores the Lambertian re flectance model to derive differences between the 2-D images of the face presented during an attack and a real (3-D) face, in real-access attempts. It does so by de riving an equation that estimates the latent reflectance information that exists on images captured in both sce narios using either a variational retinex-based method or a far simpler difference-of-gaussians [11] based ap proach similar to [12] . This is the first work on litera ture to propose a publicly available database specif ically tailored towards the development of spoofing counter-measures.
[13] present a technique to evalu ate liveness based on a short sequence of images using a binary detector that evaluates the trajectories of se lected parts of the face presented to the input sensor using a simplified optical flow analysis followed by an heuristic classifier. The same authors introduce in [14] a method for fusing scores from different experts sys tems that observe, concurrently, the 3-D face motion scheme introduced on the previous work and live ness properties such as eye-blinks or mouth movements.
[15] the authors propose a method to detect attacks pro duced with planar media (such as paper or screens) using motion estimation by optical flow.
Texture analysis counter-measures take advantage of texture patterns that may look unnatural when ex ploring the input image data. Examples of detectable texture patterns are printing failures or overall image blur.
[12] describes a method for print-attack detec tion by exploiting differences in the 2-D Fourier spec tra comparing the hard-copies of client faces and real accesses. The method will work well for down-sampled photos of the attacked identity, but is likely to fail for higher-quality samples. In [16] the author proposes a method to detect spoofing attacks using printed photos by analyzing the micro-textures present on the paper using a linear SVM classifier [17] . One limitation of this method is that the input image needs to be reasonably sharp.
Liveness detection tries to capture signs of life from the user images by analysing spontaneous movements that cannot be detected in photographs, such as eye blinks.
[18] and [19] bring a real-time liveness detec tion specifically against photo-spoofing using (sponta neous) eye-blinks which are supposed to occur once ev ery 2-4 seconds in humans. The system developed uses an undirected conditional random field framework to model the eye-blinking that relaxes the independence assumption of generative modelling and state depen dence limitations from hidden Markov modelling. A later work by the same authors [20] augment the num ber of counter-measures deployed to include a scene context matching that helps preventing video-spoofing in stationary face-recognition systems.
The PRINT-ATTACK Database
The PRINT-ATTACK biometric (face) database2 consists of short video recordings of both real-access and attack attempts to 50 different identities. To create the dataset each person recorded a number of videos at 2 different stationary conditions:
• controlled: In this case the background of the scene is uniform and the light of a fluorescent lamp illuminates the scene;
• adverse: In this case the background of the scene is non-uniform and day-light illuminates the scene.
Under these two different conditions, people were asked to sit down in front of a custom acquisition sys tem built on an Apple 13-inch MacBook laptop and capture two video sequences with a resolution of 320 by 240 pixels (QVGA), at 25 frames-per-second and of 15 seconds each (375 frames). Videos were recorded using Apple's Quicktime format (MOV files).
The laptop is positioned on the top of a short sup port (",15 cm) so that faces are captured as they look up-front. The acquisition operator launches the cap turing program and asks the person to look into the laptop camera as they would normally do waiting for a recognition system to do its task. The program shows a reproduction of the current image being captured and, overlaid, the output of a face-detector used to guide the person during the session. In this particular setup, faces are detected using a cascade of classifiers based on a variant of Local Binary Patterns (LBP) [21] referred as Modified Census Transform (MCT) [22] . The face detector helps the user self-adjusting the distance from the laptop camera and making sure that a face can be detected at all times during the acquisition. After ac quisition was finished, the operator would still verify the videos did not contain problems by visual inspec tion and proceed to acquire the next video.
Collecting samples and generating the attacks
Under the same illumination and background set tings used for real-access video clips, the acquisition operator took two high-resolution pictures of each per son using a 12.1 megapixel Canon PowerShot SX150 IS camera that would be used as basis for the spoofing attempts. People were asked to cooperate in with this part of the acquisition so as to maximize the chances of an attack to succeed. They were asked to look up-front such as in the acquisition of the real-access attempts.
To realize the attacks, hard copies of the digital photographs were printed on plain A4 paper using a Triumph-Adler DCC 2520 color laser printer. Figure 1 shows some examples of printed copies. The left col umn contains samples taken from the controlled sce nario, while the right column shows samples from the adverse scenario.
Using such images, the operator generates the at tacks by displaying the printouts of each client to the same acquisition setup used for sampling the real-client accesses. Video clips of about 10 seconds are captured for each spoof attempt, in two different attack modes:
• hand-based attacks: in this mode, the operator holds the prints using their own hands;
• fixed-support attacks: the operator glues the client prints to the wall so they don't move during the spoof attempt.
The first set of (hand-based) attacks show a shak ing behavior that can be observed when people hold photographs of spoofed identities in front of cameras and that, sometimes, can trick eye-blinking detectors [19] . It differs from the second set that is completely static and should be easier for liveness-based counter measures to spoofing.
Performance Figures
A spoofing detection system is subject to two types of errors, either the real access is rejected (false rejec tion) or an attack is accepted (false acceptance). In order to measure the performance of a spoofing detec tion system, we use the Half Total Error Rate (HTER), which combines the False Rejection Rate (FRR) and the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and is defined as: Another widely used measure to summarise the perfor mance of a system is the Equal Error Rate (EER), de fined as the point along the ROC or DET curve where the FAR equals the FRR.
Protocols
The set of 400 videos (200 real-accesses and 200 at tacks) is decomposed into 3 subsets allowing for train ing, development and testing of binary classifiers. Iden tities for each subset were chosen randomly but do not overlap, i.e. people that are on one of the subsets do not appear in any other set. This choice guarantees that specific behavior (such as eye-blinking patterns or head-poses) are not picked up by detectors and final systems generalize well.
Moreover, each print-attack subset can be further sub-classified into two groups that split the attack ing support used during the acquisition (hand-based or fixed-support). Counter-measures developed using this database should report error figures that consider both separated and aggregated grouping, from which it is possible to understand which types of attacks are better handled by the proposed method. and print-attack attempts and how they are split in the different subsets and groups. It is recommended that training and development samples are used to learn classifiers how to discrimi nate. One trivial example is to use the training set for training the classifier itself and the development data to estimate when to stop training. A second possibil ity, which may generalize less well, is to merge both training and development sets, using the merged set as training data and to formulate a stop criteria. Finally, the test set should be solely used to report error rates and performance curves. If a single number is desired, a threshold T should be chosen at the development set and the HTER reported using the test set data. As means of uniformizing reports, we recommend choos ing the threshold T on the EER at the development set.
We now define a baseline technique that can be used as comparison point for future work developed using this database, exemplifying how error should be re ported.
The Proposed Counter-Measure
Motion-based algorithms for anti-spoofing typically use complex methods such as Optical Flow estimators to extract deformation patterns from the image being analyzed. Nevertheless, for stationary recognition sys tems, another far simpler clue can be effectively used to distinguish between real-accesses and attacks: the relative movement intensity between the face and the scene background. In the case of an attack, using a photograph or a video-clip, it should be possible to ob serve a high-correlation between the total amount of movement in these two regions of interest (RoI).
Feature Extraction
For this baseline technique we ignore the move ment direction and focus on intensity only. The to tal motion in the RoI is calculated using simple gray scaled frame-difference and an area-based normaliza tion technique that removes differences in size so dif ferent face/background regions remain comparable as 5 . In the case of the face, the support region is provided by same face detector used during the acquisition. The background is computed by making D the whole im age and subtracting the part relative to the face prior to averaging. Noise arriving from the face localisation is avoided by considering the face region not to move between two consecutive images.
-�
The calculation of M'O, even considering both RoIs, can be implemented in a very efficient manner allow ing the variable to be computed for every two images in the sequence being observed. Figure 2 shows the evolution of M'O for both face and background in two scenarios: a real-access (a) and an attack (b). As it can be observed, the motion variations exhibit greater correlation in the case of an attack. Also note that the M'O signal for an attack seems to exhibit more vari ations in time, characterized by the amount of signal energy and higher-frequency components.
Classification
To input the motion coefficients into a classifier and avoid the variability in time, we extract 5 quantities that describe the signal pattern for windows of N non overlapping images. The 5 quantities are the minimum of the signal in the window, the maximum, the average, the standard deviation and the ratio R between the spectra sum for all non-DC components components and the DC component itself taking as basis the N point Fourier transform of the signal at the window (see Equation 3) . (3) These quantities allow for a trained classifier to eval uate the degree of synchronized shaking within the scene, during the period of time defined by N. If there is no movement (fixed support attack) or too much movement (hand-based attack), the input data is likely to come from a spoof attempt. Normal ac cesses will exhibit decorrelated movement between the two RoIs as normal users move independently from the background.
Temporal Processing
In order to combine the time information with that of the window-based classifier, we accumulate the out put over time for every block of N frames and apply a very simple binary decision scheme using a majority wins approach. For every output the threshold T de fined at the EER on the development set is applied and, if the output is greater than T we label it as a real-access, with a value of 1. Otherwise, we apply a label of o. After a number M of decisions have been collected, we average the values attributed in each win dow and check if such a value exceeds 0.5. If that is the case, by majority of votes, we determine the video comes from a real-access, otherwise, a spoof attempt.
Experiments
For this work, the window size N has been arbitrar ily fixed at 20. This value represents roughly a second of activity and allows the counter measure to be applied in discrete moments when integrated into a face recog nition framework. After the calculation of Mv, the in put signal is broken into 20-point non-overlapping win dows and fed to a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) classi fier [24] with 5 hidden neurons, matching the number of inputs, and a single output node. Tries to increase the number of neurons on the hidden layer did not show better generalization and increases the probability of over-fitting. Reducing the number of neurons in such a layer showed performance degradation.
The network is trained using a resilient back propagation algorithm [25] and exclusively using the training set video sequences. To avoid over-fitting and improve generalization, the development set is used to Table 2 . The curves are traced using all data available in the respective sets (hand + fixed-support).
stop the training procedure as soon as the squared output error on such a set reaches its first minimum. After training, a threshold is chosen on the equal-error rate (EER) using the development set and, based on such a value, the test set is used to evaluate the final performance of the classifier. Table 2 summarizes the best results for the print attack development and test set classification. Figure 3 shows the DET curve for both the test and develop ment sets taking as base the same classifier.
Results
Naturally, for the training procedure, the MLP weights are initialized randomly. To assure stable con vergence we repeated the training procedure several times (> 10), verifying equivalent minima is reached for the squared error and similar generalization is achieved by the MLP network. Other MLP's, trained using the same parameters, achieve similar results, with differ ence of only 1 percent on the test HTER. 
Number of frames Figure 4 . Half-total error rate on the test set with thresholds chosen a priori on the EER at the development set, as time passes.
Results shown so far take into consideration overall classification accuracy for windows of 20 images and no attention has been given to the order in which such windows happen. In other words, during the train ing procedure, no special attention is given to the time variable associated with each of 20-frame window ex tracted from the motion signal MD. It is natural to assume though one cannot reach the level of accuracy at Figure 3 by only looking at the first 20 images of a scene. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the half-total error rate on the test set, with a threshold chosen a priori on the EER at the development set as time passes using the majority-wins approach as defined on Section 4.
Discussion
Results in Table 2 show one can achieve about 9% HTER on the test set with a threshold chosen a pri ori on the development set using the proposed motion based technique as a counter-measure to spoofing. It is also possible to observe that the trained classifier per forms better to discriminate attacks executed with the attacker's own hands (",7.3% HTER on the test set). This effect is related to the total energy of movement on those attacks and the way such energy is distributed across the spectra of motion M. In fixed-support at tacks there is no movement in the scene and all cap tured information concerning the motion M can only be originated from encoding noise. In such case, the proposed classification scheme is still able to perform well (",11 % HTER on the test set). Real-accesses sit in between these two types of attacks when analyzed with respect to their motion pattern M. A person try ing to be recognized will hold still as much as possible and observed motion is only originated by involuntary movements of eyes, natural head swings or voluntary (less important) lip movements. Figure 4 summarizes the evolution in time of the accuracy of the proposed detection scheme. As it can be seen, only after 60 frames (or 3 decisions have been taken) the first drop in the HTER for the test set is observed. This effect is due to the majority wins approach as doubtful cases in which the decision has flipped in the previous slots would only be con firmed after the arrival of the third decision. Advanc ing on time will only reveal improvement again when the fifth decision is taken, resolving the draws in the first four rounds. After this point, the HTER converges smoothly so it is about 5% after 220 frames which rep resents about 9 seconds of time. We again confirm our expectations that the system would work better for hand-based attacks by observing that the HTER on that subset is always smaller or equal to the values on the fixed-support column.
Conclusion
One of the easiest ways to spoof a 2-D face recog nition system is by the use of photographs of at tacked identities. This problem has been understood for nearly a decade now and, yet, no consensus seems to exist on techniques or best-practices to avoid this. Literature is scarce and results are difficult to general ize. To remedy this aspect, we made public a PRINT ATTACK dataset and exemplified how to use its com panion protocol with a motion-based algorithm that detects correlations between the client head movements and the scene context. The database is sufficiently large and contains a diverse set of spoofing attacks un der different conditions. Paper-based print attacks represent only one of the many ways to attack a 2-D face recognition system. With the decreasing prices of mobile phones and high resolution portable devices, one can expect these sup ports to replace paper also for spoofing. To cover more ground, we should consider the recording of new at tacks using these display media as well as different pa per type such as those used for customer photographic prints.
Other possible types of attack that need to be con sidered are those using videos and three-dimensional masks. They represent respectively the second and third most probable attack strategies after pho tographs. We can also expect interest would grow in this direction.
One variable often disregarded in research is the mo tion pattern introduced by the attacker, while display ing the device with the photograph of the client face being attacked. A natural extension to this dataset and to this work is therefore to explore different attackers and lighting conditions. Such variables will likely im pact motion-based counter-measures.
